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DECLINE AND FALL OFTHE SPANISH MERCHANTS AT BUENOS AIRES:
MARCO DEL PONT IN THE AGE OF INDEPENDENCE
Jonathan C. Brown
In the four decades of commercial growth that followed the establishment of Buenos Aires in 1776
as capital of the new Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, Spanish-born merchants resident in that city
carne to be its leading citizens. Porteño society differed from that of many other Spanish American
cities in that Buenos Aires' wealthiest and most-respected citizens were not primarily government offi-
cials, miners, landowners, or the titled nobility. They were overseas merchants who, of necessity,
cultivated political connections but not land.1 These merchants controlled the importation of slaves
and mercury and the exportation of silver and hides. Their credit supported the merchandising of
European finished goods throughout the Southern Cone of South America. Invariably marrying native-
born daughters of older Spanish merchants in Buenos Aires, these Iberian-born comerciantes
established families that diversified into local marketing and public office yet seldom into land during
the viceregal periodo The powerful merchant community also assisted in the political administration of
the colonies, financing publíc officials and collecting taxes and fees on commission for the crown. In
fact, much of a Spaniard's access to commercial wealth depended on his political influence. As the
leading social group, the merchants supported the social institutions of the Spanish presence in the Río
de la Plata-the church, Catholic charities, and the religious brotherhoods. Without doubt, the porteño
commercial class provided the glue that held together Spain's vast empire in South America.
Yet by 1810, the power of this group had been reduced, and the Spanish-born merchants were
unable to prevent the passing of political and economic power to their hitherto less-privileged Creole
brethren. The end result of this disintegration was independence. In the process of its precipitous
decline, the Spanish merchant class at Buenos Aires lost control of its trade, its social ties throughout
the region, its political power and, ultimately, its own weallh. The independence movement in the Río
de la Plata, insofar as it transferred polítical power and income away from the Spanish-born merchants
and to a disunified group of native-born politicians and troop commanders, may be considered a social
revolution in that it sought to restructure society in an abrupt if limited fashion.
The revolution for independence, of cour:;e, would have been impossible had there not been first a
breakdown of the Spanish Empire. Tulio Halperín Donghi has remarked how sudden this breakdown
was. In a real sense, there were few precedents to the independence movement in the Río de la Plata;
rather, a progressive weakening of Spain and the Spaniards in the Americas provoked the political
crisis in May 1910 that those who led the revolution had not foreseen even two years earlier.2
External problems induced internal crisis, as events in Europe during the first decade of the
nineteenth century tended to undermine the economic and political authority of Spain in America.
Spain's initial alliance with Napoleon caused, among other things, a British blockade of Spain and the
British invasion of the Río de la Plata in 1806 and 1807. In the next year, Napoleon turned on his ally
and sent troops into the Peninsula, capturing the Spanish royal farnily. Both the 10ss of royal authority
and the recurrent economic depressions throughout the empire induced American-born elites to
challenge the political hegemony of Spaniards in the colonies. The first manifestation of independence
in 1810 produced the cabildo abierto in Buenos Aires, the most dramatic and decisive event in the
region's break from Spanish tutelage.
This paper will review those factors that led to the breakdown of Spanish political and commercial
hegemony in the Río de la Plata as revealed in the career of one influential Spanish merchant at Buenos
Aires. Ventura Miguel Marcó del Pont, born in 1762 at the port of Vigo in Galícia, acted as the
ISusan Migden Socolow, The Merchants of Buenos Aires. 1778-1810 (Carnbridge,
England: Carnbridge University Press, 1978), pp. 14-16,54,65.
2Tulio Halperín Donghi, Revolución y guerra: formación de una élite dirigente en la
Argentina criolla (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1972), pp. 130-131.
commercial representative in Buenos Aires of his father's Spanish merchant house, A collection of his
papers at the Benson Latin American Collection of the Oniversity of Tcxas al Austin chp')\..:ks the
decline of empire at Buenos Aires between 1805 and 1810. The European wars of the first decade of
the nineteenth century destroyed those social bonds in America among Spanish-born merchants and
officials that for two and one-half centuries had held together the empire in the name of the king - and
of individual profit and privilege. Once undermined by external events, the Spaniards at Buenos Aires
like Marcó del Ponl fell prey lo the newly aroused political and economic aspirations of thcir erstwhile
collaborators, the native-born Creoles. Perhaps the very depth of social dislocation that succeeded Lhe
war stands as testimony to how important those social and commercial bonds had becn.
FOREIGN TRADE IN THE VICEROY ALTY
Foreign and internal trade held togethcr the Viceroyalty of thc Río de la Plata, whose vast
territories sprcad from the windswept altiplano of Alto Pcrú through the arid foothills of Mendoza, to
the rain forests of Paraguay, and to the lush grasslands of the Banda Oriental and Buenos Aires. Marcó
dcl Pont was one of those wholesale import-export merchants residing in the port and capital city of
Buenos Aires who connected Spain lo the distant cities of the empire. With influence based on family
ties and his Galician origin, Marcó actively directed a commercial network that included Lima,
Santiago de Chile, Mendoza, and Córdoba in the west, Potosí in the northwest, Montevideo, Colonia,
and the smaller rivcr ports in the Paraná River basin, and Vigo and Málaga in Spain (see map). He
utilized the legal instruments of invoices and letters of credit (facturas andlibranzas) throughout the
Southern Cone to exchange European goods, domestic commodities, slaves, silver, and hides. In this
kind of business, Marcó differed liule from other successful Buenos Aires merchants of Spanish birth
who had been maintaining commercial tics based on kinship. Gaspar de Santa Coloma, an older
Basquc-born merchant , since the 1780s had been rcselling imported goods at a 20 to 80 percent
markup in Montevideo, Córdoba, Santa Fe, San Juan, Asunción, Tucumán, and Santiago del Estero.3
Dcspite its sophistication, the commercial system, even in the best of times, was vulnerable lo distance
and competition. Under such conditions, the trust born of social ties between the Spanish-born
merchants was more important than libranzas.
Marcó del Pont owed his leading position in porteño commerce to the connections his family with
the court of Carlos III and later that of Ferdinand VII. A younger brother served in the Spanish army,
eventually becoming a general during the Napoleonic wars. Marcó received shipments of European
goods fmm his father's merchant house in Vigo. He shipped cargo and correspondence to Europe via
Spanish ship captains with whom his family had provincial ties.4
Credit lubricated the fragile Spanish commercial system in the Río de la Plata, and Marcó
extended credit throughout the region beginning at the port of Montevideo. The chief port on the
eSluary of the Río de la Plata (at least for Marcó) was not Buenos Aires itself but its sister city,
Montevideo. Al! thefragatas and goletas involved in Marcó's trade with Europe arrived and departed
from Montevideo. The largest and most productive of the region's cattle ranches were located along
the estuary west of Montevid('Á),and the first hide- and meat-salting slaughterhouses, callcd saladeros,
were established in the Banda Oriental as early as the 1790s lo serve the export trade. Despite the
advantagcs of the harbor and the productiveness of its hinterland, however, Montevideo was
subordinated politically and commercially to Ihe viceregal capital. Establishment of the consulado, or
merchant's guild, at Buenos Aires in 1794 made it imperative that the major Spanish merchant houses
3Socolow, The Merchanls 01Buenos Airl!s, pp. 154-155.
4Carlos Camufse (?) lo Ventura Miguel Marcó del Pont, Montevideo, March 15, 1809;
Pedro Olasarria (?) lo Marcó, Montevideo, March 29, 1809, file 17, Papeles, Ventura Miguel
Marc6 del Pont, Benson Latin American Col!ection, University ofTexas at Austin. All the
manuscript documents cited below belong to this manuscript collection.
maintain their residences there - even though the Banda Oriental contained much of their export
business. 5
Because of Montevideo's economic importance, Marcó del Pont maintained warehouses, retail
shops, and a subsidiary merchant house there. Commercial agents there received Spanish wine and
iron products, Brazilian cacao, Portuguese beer, Dutch woolens, and Oriental silks on Marcó's account.
In turn, they extended these goods to retail merchants on their own accounts, exchangingfacturas and
libranzas for the goOOs.6 Numerous boatmen contracted to the Marcó house carried cargos and
messages between Buenos Aires and Montevideo and Colonia on the Banda Oriental. At times, Marcó
expressed some frustration at being the long-term creditor-sometimes for ayear or longer-of a large
number of retailers. He extended credit only to "morally secure buyers, as my desire is to terminate
these brief business deals to avoid the inconveniences that they cause." 7 Such arrangcments were
necessary because the export of silver specie by the merchants and by govemment tax collectors had
robbed the prosperous and expanding economy of the viceroyalty of its liquid capital. Nearly one-half
of the region's export trade between 1794 and 1810 consisted of gold and silver.8 Long-term credit
arrangements of necessity tied up Marcó's capital, a fact that renderOO him especially vulnerable to
wartime disruptions.
From headquarters in Buenos Aires, Marcó del Pont directed the collection of hides and other
cattle products from Colonia on the Banda Oriental and from ports on the Paraná and Uruguay rivers.
At Colonia, he employed Sosa y Cía. to collect dried and saltoo hides from the large estancias in the
vicinity. Sosa then gave out libranzas drawn on Marcó that the cattlemen were to present for cash
payment in Buenos Aires "at eight days sight." Salt, an important item of trade, was shipped from
Buenos Aires to the saladeros of the Banda Oriental.9 Additional rural products (frutos de la tierra)
destined for intemational trade carne to Marcó from several river ports. Marcó's merchant house
maintainOO a number of boats (barcos) for the river trades, and his itinerant agents traveled on the
5Halperín, Revolución y guerra, p. 34; Horacio Juan Cuccorese and José Panettieri,
Argentina, manual de historia económica y social, vol. 1,Argentina criolla (Buenos Aires:
Ediciones Macchi, 1962), pp. 119-120; Germán O. E. Tjarks, El consulado de Buenos Aires y sus
proyecciones en la historia del Río de la Plata, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires: Universidad de Buenos
Aires, 1962); and Juan Carlos Nicolau, Antecedentes para la historia de la industria argentina
(Buenos Aires: Publishcd by Author, 1968), pp. 37-38.
6Manuel Ximénez y Gómez to Marcó, Montevideo, October 7, 1807; Zamora to Marcó,
Montevideo, October 14, 1807; October 21, 1807, file 12.; Karla Robinson, "The Merchants of
Post-Independence Buenos Aires," in Hispanic-American Essays in Honor of Max úon
Moorhead, oo. William S. Coker (pensacola, 1979), p. 122.
7Marcó to Pedro Nicolás de Chopitea, Buenos Aires, December 16, 1807, file 14; and
Lorenzo Antonio Maza to Marcó, Córdoba, May 16, 1807, file 7. [compradores de una moral
seguridad, pues mi deseo es de terminar estos cortos negocios para evitarle las incomodidades que
le causan.]
8Socolow, The Merchants of Buenos Aires, pp. 156-157; Laura R. Randall, A
Comparative Economic History of Latin America, 3 vols. (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms,
1977),11, 183; and John Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration. 1782-1810: The lntendant
System in the Viceroyalty ofthe Rfo de la Plata (London: University ofLond, Athlone Press,
1958), p. 44.
9Sosa to Marcó, Colonia, August 6 and 13, 1807, file 10; July 30. 1807, file 9; March




rivers, purchasing the hides of bulls, cows, and steers; the skins of horses, deer, tigers, and lions; tal-
low; sacks of horsehair; and dried meat.lO
In the best of times, colonial commerce was filled with the kind of risk and uncertainty that often
spelled disaster for many a porteño merchant. On board the river craft, moths (polillos) infested the
hides, reducing their commercial value at Buenos Aires. Occasionally, trade on the rivers consisted of
pure barter, and Marcó did not always have the ponchos on hand that river merchants wanted in
exchange for their hidcs.ll Cargo was fragile, and transport on ships, riverboats, oxcarts, and
muleback often led to the deterioration of goods. A1though it was lucrative, dealing in slaves
sometimes incurred extraordinary expenses and losses. In 1802, 35 newly imported African slaves
(negros bozales) making up one of Marco's shipments (partida) died short1y after their arrival in
Buenos Aires. Not only did his merchant house have to sustain the direct financialloss, but it had to
pay for their paupers' burial as well.12 Moreover, in all their trading activities, Marcó's agents sought
to exchange their products for silver, the ideal foreign export, yet silver was in short supply toward the
close of the colonial periodo Marcó's agents complained repeatedly of their inability to secure any
silver at all on their business trips.13
Finally, all the export merchants depended on high prices and brisk sales, for unsold products tied up
scarce capital. Low prices and slow sales occasionally brought the credit business to the brink of
disaster, as all the merchants in the system attempted at once to redeem their libranzas for cash in an
economy that lacked specie. When this happened, the merchants were not able to pay the boatrnen and
cartrnen nor to honor each other's libranzas.14 The oversupply of hides afflicting the river trades set all
the agents to lamenting. "The sad state in which our Montevideo finds itself," wrote Sosa, "has us on
this Bank [of the Río de la Plata] generally consternated." When the prices for rural exports fell in
1807, one of Marcó's agents considered everyone in Montevideo to be insolvent. This agent suggested
that the way to increase liquidity was to grant a 25 percent discount on their libranzas to those who
were able to pay cash immediately. Since this meant a loss on his invested capital, Marcó declined.15
lOManuel Bautista Brid (?) to Marcó, Conchas, April24 y 28,1807, Luis to Marcó, April
3, 1807, fíle 6; Joaquín Bermúdez to Marcó, San Nicolás, January 18, 1807, and Alberto Luis (?)
to Marcó, January 9, 1807, file 3; and Marcó to Luis, Buenos Aires, March 19, 1807, file 5.
[cueros de toro, vaca y novillo; pieles de bagual, ciervo, tigre, y león; sebo; sacos de cerda; y
charque]
llManuel Antonio Isasbirib (?) to Marcó, Conchas, December 21,1807, file 14; Marcó to
Ysasbirivil (?), Buenos Aires, January 2, 1808, file 1.
12See various documents entitled "Resumen" and receipts, December 17, 1802 to
February 7,1803, and Andrés Sánchez de Quíroz to Marcó, Lima, Apri126, 1807, file 6.
13Tomás Torizo(?) to Marcó, San Nicolás, January 23, 1807, file 3; Lorenzo Antonio
Maza to Marcó, Córdoba, December 6, 1807, file 4.
14Miguel Zamora to Marcó, Montevideo, July 22,1807, file 9; Zamora to Marcó,
October 7,1807, Juan de Dulon to Marcó, Montevideo, October 22,1807, folder 12; F. de Soria
to Marcó, Montevideo, September 30, 1807, folder 12.
15Sosa to Marcó, Colonia, January 22, 1807 file 3; Zamora to Marcó, Montevideo,
August 9,1807, file 10; Marcó to Zamora, Buenos Aires, October 17, 1807, file 12. ["La triste
Situación en que Se alla nuestra Montevideo, nos tiene consternado generalment a toda esta
Banda."]
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IN1ERNAL 1RADE AND COMMERCE
Spanish-born merchants such as Marcó del Pont also provided commercial cohesion to a vast
network that bound the distant cities of the Southern Cone to Buenos Aires. Kinship and Spanish
origin ensured both the political and the economic unity of the Spanish American empire. Marcó del
Pont maintained connections with relatives and kin, all of whom assisted one another in the exchange
and retailing of goods in Córdoba, Mendoza, Santiago, Lima, and Alto Perú.
In Córdoba, the second most populous city in the viceroyalty, Marcó had a cousin who
coordinated the sale of European imports that carne through Marcó's merchant house in Buenos Aires.
Addressing Marcó del Pont as "my most beloved cousin" ("mi más amado primo"), Lorenzo Antonio
Maza served as the most important auxiliary for the family's commerce in the interior. His warehouse
in Córdoba received goods from Buenos Aires via a train of oxcarts (tropa de carretas). He separated
those goods to be sold in Córdoba and sent the rest on to Mendoza and Potosí. Maza also took charge
of retailing goods on Marcó's account in his shop at the center of Córdoba. He sent Marcó letters via
the correo, which arrived in Buenos Aires within a week, to inform Marcó of the latest prices on the
plazaand to notify him of those foreign items in demand by cordobés consumers. In all, Marcó car-
ried his cousin for more than 7,000 pesos over a period of several months before sales permitted Maza
to deduct his profit of approximately 8 percent and repay Marcó's line of credit.16
Spaniards seemed to have controlled most retail sales of European goods in Córdoba, often
combining political functions and business. Córdoba's town council (cabildo) named Maza the
Defending Magistrate of the Poor (Regidor Defensor de Pobres). His competitor had been a Catalán
shopkeeper who was closely associated with the royal governor of Córdoba and with the powerful
porteño merchant clan of Lezica. Having engaged in local politics to enhance his own business, Maza
suffered when rival merchants received political favoritismo He complained to Marcó del Pont that
official incompetence and arbitrariness, especially in collection of customs duties and sales taxes
(alcabala), favored his commercial rivals-despite Maza's own "unselfish" public services.17 Sales at
Córdoba, even in the best of times, had to overcome the other vicissitudes of colonial commerce at the
beginning of the nineteenth century: low prices and slow turnover. The scarcityof silver in Córdoba
and low prices delayed the payoff of credit.18 Often the merchant providing credit waited one year or
longer to collect on the sales of retail items.
Marcó del Pont extended his ties of kinship and patronage to Mendoza in his effort to join the
interests of empire and those of his own profit. The porteño merchant expanded his business by
sending clients to Mendoza. Immigrating Spaniards who had known Marcó's father in Vigo even left
their families in Marcó's household in Buenos Aires while seeking their fortunes in Mendoza, being
helped along the way by a number of Marcó's correspondents.19 The overlapping political and
commercial functions of the merchants at Buenos Aires allowed Marcó to solidify his influence in far-
off Mendoza. A mendocino correspondent requested that Marcó intercede with the captain general in
Buenos Aires to secure promotion of two officers of the militias in Mendoza.20
16Maza to Marcó, Córdoba, January 16, 1807, file 3; March 1807, file 5; April20, 1807,
file 6; August 16, 1807, file 10.
17Maza to Marcó, Córdoba, January 16, 1807, file 3; Abril 16, 1807, file 6; Septiembre
16, 1807, file 11.
18Maza to Marcó, Córdoba, December 16, 1807, me 4.
19Narciso Benavídez to Marcó, Mendoza, February 9,1807, Antonio Monte to Marcó,
Mendoza, February 16, 1807, me 4; Manuel Felipe del Molina to Marcó, Mendoza, August 3,
1807, file 10; Molina to Marcó, Mendoza, September 6, 1807, file 11.
20Molina to Marcó, Mendoza, September 6, 1807, file 11; Faustino Amayl (?) to Marcó,
Mendoza,October 29,1807, file 12.
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Marcó a1so extended his network of patronage, credit, and correspondence to the west coast of
South America. The royal mails that crossed the Andean passes permitted him 10correspond with his
agents in Santiago de Chile within three weeks 10one month and with Lima within an additional one 10
two weeks. In fact, Marcó provided much of the credit upon which his compatriots in both Lima and
Chile operated. His agents on the west coast of South America dea1t not on1y with European goods,
which increasing1y arrived in non-Spanish ships, but in Guayaquil cacao, Chi1ean copper, Asian
cinnamon, and siaves imported through Buenos Aires. Upon selling four slaves (for 460 pesos each)
sent to Lima on Marcó's account, the Lima agent proposed investing the proceeds in Guayaquil cacao,
Peruvian quinine bark (cascarilla), and sugar for further marketing along the West Coast21 In a 6,000-
peso deal, Marcó also provided all the credit for the import through Valparaíso of twe1ve bags of
cinnamon (churlas de canela) for resale in Santiago and Lima. The profits of this sale u1timate1ywent
into the purchase of 40,000 kilograms (4,000 quintales) of Chilean copper for resale in Lima.22
Marcó's west coast business consisted of the transport and reselling of non-European goods,
because European ships, the large number of which set in motion some price uncertainty for Spanish
merchants at the ports of Valparaíso and Callao. Ships from Hamburg, for examp1e, even bypassed
Spanish restrictions on British trade by landing first in Eng1and on trips to South America.23 Chilean-
bom contrabandistas who were dealing dírectly with American and British ships competed by
underselling Spanish competitors. Spaniards, who claimed to have paid their customs duties faithfully,
unlike the contrabandistas, supported the establishment of several customs outposts (resguardos) on the
coast. In reality, Spaniards also engaged in smuggling and in dealing in stolen goods. 24 Meanwhile,
the abundance of European goods in Santiago and Lima stretched out the who1esaler's credit because
sales were so slow. Reported the Lima correspondent: "Sales are fatal here on account of the numerous
effects that the treacherous British enemies are introducing 10us now with contraband and then with
permissib1e trade, so that I do not lose sight of the many ways theír treachery seeks to ruin us. ,,25
At the close of the colonial period, as his correspondence makes clear, Marcó del Pont had
commercial interests in the far comers of the Spanish American Empíre. Although he utilized
kinship and regional ties among Spaniards to establish the necessary trust needed for 10ng-distance
trade in South America, the presSures of competition and contraband seemed etemally 10threaten the
delicate credit structure of colonial commerce. As a whole, Spain's colonial trade suffered a volatile
series of booms and busts between 1790 and 1810. The volume of trade during two periods, 1797 to
1801 and 1805 to 1808, fell to levels just 10 percent of what they were in 1790.26 Unpredictab1e
and deep commercial depressions p1aced enormous pressure on the overseas merchants within the
co10nies. Although fragile, the Spanish long-distance commercia1 system had contributed to
imperial unity through the first decade of the nineteenth century. However, that very fragility would
lead 10breakdown.
21Sánchez de Quíroz to Marcó, Lima, October 26,1807, file 12; January 26,1807, file 3;
July 26,1807, file 9.
22 "Cuenta de la venta, gastos y líquido. . . ," Lima, Apri120, 1807, file 6; Chopitea 10
Marcó, Santiago de Chile, December 9,1807, file 14.
23Sánchez de Quíroz to Marcó, Lima, June 26, 1807, file 8.
24Chopitea 10Marcó, Santiago, Chile, January 8,1807, file 3; March 11, 1807, file 5.
25Chopitea 10Marcó, Santiago, Chile, February 8, 1807, file 4; Sánchez de Quíroz to
Marcó, Lima, Apri126, 1807, file 6. ["Las ventas están fatales a causa delos muchisimos efectos
que los perfidos enemigos [los ingleses] nos estan yntroduciendo ya de contrabando eya con
permisos, de modo que no omiten me vio de quantos les Sugiere su perfidia para arruinamos. "]
26See Javier Cuenca Esteban, "Statistics of Spain's Colonial Trade, 1792-1820," Hispanic
American Historical Review 62, no. 3 (1981): 384 - 428.
COLLECTION OF CHURCH TAXES
In addition to the bonds of commerce, Spaniards also provided the bureaucratic connections that
united the distant parts of the Spanish American empire. Marcó del Pont illustrates weIl the sort of
bureaucratic-commercial functions to which many influential Spaniards in the Americas, apparently
under the general assumption that public service and private profit were not at all mutually exclusive,
subscribed. Marcó received an imperial commission to coIlect the special wartime taxes on church-
held mortgages, caIled the Consolidación de Vales de la Iglesia, from Chile, Alto Perú, and Mendoza
and to remit them to Spain. The problem for the Spanish crown was that it had to raise unpopular taxes
and to extract the greatest amount of revenues (for its European wars) at the very moment that the sheer
weight of the taxation was raising great opposition in the colonies. Yet such tax commissions enabled
some Spanish merchants like Marcó del Port personally to profit from the coIlection and transfer of
public monies. However, Marcó's involvement in tax farming involved him in politics more than he
may have wished when the British invasion of the Río de la Plata stimulated a Creole political on-
slaught.
The history of Marcó del Pont's public service may illustrate as weIl a second feature of Spanish
colonial government in the Indies - its haphazard effectiveness in raising revenues. In 1805, the
general accountant of the Royal House of the Consolidation of Mortgages (Contador General de la
Real Casa de Consolidacion de Vales) in Madrid gave the commission to a certain Espinosa to collect
120,000 pesos fram the royal treasury at Buenos Aires. As if the commission were personal property
to be dispensed as the holder wished, Espinosa subsequently sold it to Marcó del Pont in Vigo.27
When Marcó presented his credentials to the Viceregal government, the viceroy and his treasurer
admitted not yet having coIlected the funds and taxes belonging to the Consolidation. The Marqués de
Sobremonte subsequently ordered aIl intendants and subdelegates of the provinces to send these taxes
to the treasury. Within several months, when it had became clear that the viceroy's subordinates were
not complying-and under pressure of Marcó del Pont-the Marqués de Sobremonte sent out the
following order:28
Having often repeated its instructions about coIlecting the yearly rents that ought to
be paid in fuIl for the provisions in High Offices, Canons, and Sinecures of the
Church of the Realm, it makes itself become very necessary to establish a method
that serves as a general rule on the matter and at the same time avoids the repetition
of similar controversies with which the Concern is been denied the prompt receipt of
its legitimate revenues, the attention of this Superior Authority and those of the other
Provincial Chiefs of the Viceroyality are interrupted also frequently, I have declared
that it is a praper object that each individual who, by reason of having been presented
for some High Office, Cononry, or Sinecure ought to pay in fuIl the corresponding
yearly rent by quarters or by eighths, according to the resolution that has been re-
ceived fram the governing commision of the Consolidation; for that purpose Don
Ventura Miguel Marcó has been named the General Receiver of the Funds of the
Consolidation or he will direct the payments to the power of this Accountant of the
Diezmos according what has been agreed, giving notice always to the respective
Governor Intendant or the Chief who exercises those functions, so that for his part he
may also communicate with this Superior Authority.
Marcó himself assumed the coIlection of church monies fram Alto Perú. The 10ng-distance
correspondence to Alto Perú is instructive of the kinds of social ties that Spaniards maintained as a
functional element in unifying the disparate parts of the empire. The Spaniards in Potosí and
27Miguel Caytano Voler to Manuel Siso de Espinosa, Madrid, May 18, 1805, file 1.
28El Marqués de Sobremonte to Marcó, Buenos Aires, January 25, 1806 and November
15, 1806, file 2. See Appendix. ["caudales procedentes del Noveno decimal y demás arvitrios
correspondientes a la Caja de Consolidación de Vales Reales."]
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Cochabamba either knew Marcó personally or had maintained a distant yet binding trust based on
nationa1 and regional origino In deference, perhaps, to social and commercia1 standing, Marcó
addressed one of the Cochabamba merchants as "my master" ("mi dueño"), and Alto Perú cor-
respondents referred to Marcó's father-in-law and "padre político" (who was an older Spanish-bom
merchant in Buenos Aires) or to Marcó's own fami1y in Vigo. Ultimate1y, the Consolidation monies
were remitted to Marcó in a commercia1 expOOitionof oxcarts be10nging to a Potosí merchant whose
nephew personally accompanied the cart train (tropa) from Potosí to Buenos Aires.29 It may be well
to note that these Spaniards withdrew commissions of 1 percent plus expenses for their public service
in the collection and transfer of these funds, and Marcó deducted his expenses (gastos) as well.30
Such were the individual rewards of imperial service!
The collection provOOsuccessfu1, and Marcó soon carne into the possession of some 101,000 pesos
in cash and an additional 20,000 pesos that somewhere a10ng the 1ine had been convertOO (or paid) in
hides.31 Wartime events soon were to compound his public mission, for British warships and troops in
the Río de la Plata preventOOMarcó from remitting the proceeds of the Conso1idation to Spain.
THE COSTS OF BRITISH INVASION
As the European war had weakenOOthe Empire of Spain, the British invasion of the Río de la Plata
definitive1y ruptured these Spanish social bonds in the viceroya1ty. Spaniard and Creo1e fought
together to repulse the British invaders. However, the very participation of the Creo1es as militia
1eaders in imperial defense ultimate1y undermined the social hegemony-and thus the commercia1 and
po1itica1positions-{)f men like Marcó del Pont. As a Spaniard, Marcó ultimately became a victim of
the American repercussions of European war.
On the eve of Marcó's collection of the Consolidación de Vales, in June 1806, a British naval
squadron landed troops at Buenos Aires. The unauthorized expOOition of Sir Home Riggs Popham
appealcd to the British merchant community, however, for the European Wars had ended a very
prosperous, though indirect, trade carriOOout between Great Britain, Spain, and the Spanish Americas.
Popham had thought an attack on the viceregal capital would encourage the colonia1s to rise up against
the "unpopular" Spanish ru1ers. But the colonial militias, twelve hundrOOstrOng, expellOOthe British
fram Buenos Aires and captured the arrny commander, General Beresford. The British forces
meanwhile slJcceedOOin capturing Montevideo and Colonia, which they held for nine months. In late
June 1807, General Whitelock and British reinforcements retumed to lay seige to Buenos Aires a
second time. Not only did he suffer anothcr defeat at the hands of the Creole militias but he abandonOO
the Banda Oriental as well. In the meantime, British industrialists had expected to reap profits.
Instead, they flooded the impon markets of the Río de la Plata with so much woo1ens, 1inens,
glassware, boots, rum, and furniture that prices plummeted below cost. Severa1 local merchants,
Marcó del Pont among them, sought to purchase cheap British goods and ho1d them in their
warehouses for subsequent sale at marked up prices.32 Such acts may have made commercia1 sense,
but they might also be construed as tre,asonous.
29Marcó to Gerónimo de Marrón y Lombera, Buenos Aires, October 26, 1807, me 12;
Marrón y Lombera to Marcó, Cochabamba, February 15, 1808, file 15; Ynda1ecio Gómez de
Socasa to Marcó, Potosí, December 27,1807, file 14.
30Marrón y Lombera, Cochabamba, August 15,1808, file 15.
31Marcó to Sobremonte, Buenos Aires, December 28, 1806, file 2; Sobremonte to Marcó,
Montevideo, January 7,1807, file 3; Marrón y Lombera to Marcó, Cochabamba, September 15,
1807, file 11.
320n the British invasion, see R. A. Humphreys, Liberation in South America.1806-
1827: The Career 01James Paroissien (London: University ofLondon, 1952), pp. 3-10; lohn
Mawe, Travels in the Interior 01Brazil, 2d oo. (Landon: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, & Brown,
1823), pp. 14-15; H.S. Feros, "British Informal Empire in Argentina, 1806-1914," Past & Present,
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As a plOminent merchant, Marcó del Pont both benefited and suffered flOm the British presence.
Marcó and his agents in Montevideo had begun to trade directly with the British, selling charque to the
ships sailíng for London. British trading vessels (bergantinas) exchanged manufactured goods for the
salted hides and meat flOm local saladeros.33 While the foreign troops were in Montevideo flOm
February to October 1807, Marcó's commercial agents and boat captains were dealing on a barter basis
with British merchants.
All in all, the negative impact of the British presence far outweighed the benefits to Marcó's
extensive commercial and polítical network. British ships in the estuary interrupted the passage of his
launches (lanchas) between Buenos Aires and Montevideo. Marcó had to communicate with his agents
at Colonia overland via stagecoach (diligencia). At one point, the British in Montevideo attempted to
prevent the local boatmen flOm attacking their ships by stripping them of their sails and rigging.34 At
another point, retreating British troops blOke into a warehouse in Colonia and dumped a number of
hides into the sea. Even after Spanish forces had forced British troops flOm their last stronghold at
Montevideo, British ships continued periodically to disrupt boat transport in the estuary.35 Marcó's
family life also was disrupted. When British troops threatened Buenos Aires both in July 1806 and
June 1807, he evacuated his wife and daughters to Luján and, like many wealthy Spaniards, he had
rented a house for his family in Córdoba, where most colonial already had taken refuge.36
Most damaging of all, the British invasion interrupted Marcó's communication with Europe. A
colleague flOm Alto Perú had wanted to send a confidentiaIletter to the Spanish court about a polítical
problem. Usually, Marcó del Pont would have facilitated the safe delivery of the letter thlOugh his
family connections in Vigo, but Marcó's own correspondence to Spain had been intercepted by the
British. He advised his Alto Peruvian client to take care of his own problems for the time being.37
Moreover, Marcó no longer plOfited flOm despatching exports to Spain. He had to refuse his services
to a Potosí merchant who wanted to send "four bags containing 600 pounds of Peruvian quinine bark"
thlOugh Marcó's family merchant house in Vigo to the potosino's bother. Marcó blamed "those
malicious Englishmen" for the loss of the customary one-half percent commision on such
transactions.38 .
Marcó del Pont personally paid a much higher price for the British invasion. He had made an
extraordinary loan of 70,300 pesos belonging to his collection of the Consolidación de Vales to help
pay for the defense of the viceroyalty. The patrio tic transaction occurred in Córdoba flOm monies
No. 4 (1953): 61-62; and Judith Blow Williams, "The Establishment of British Commerce with
Argentina," Hispanic American Historical Review 8, no. 2 (1935): 46-49.
33Zamora to Marcó, Montevideo, July 29,1807, file 9; November 25,1807, file 13.
34 Antonio Lopes de L (?) to Marcó, Montevideo, November 4, 1807, and Miguel de
Cabral lOMarcó, November 11, 1807, file 13; Sosa to Marcó, Colonia, December 10, 1807, file
14; and Zamora lOMarcó, Montevideo, July 29,1807, file 9. ["se han denudado de su velamen y
maniobras como a todo. "]
35Marcó to Chopitea, Buenos Aires, December 16, 1807, file 14; Sosa to Marcó, Colonia,
August 20, 1807, file 10.
36Marcó to Maza, Buenos Aires, February 26,1807, and Maza to Marcó, Córdoba,
February 16, 1807, file 4.
37Vicente Rodríguez Romano to Marcó, Plata, November 26, 1807, file 13; Marcó to
Rodríguez Romano, December 26, 1807, file 14.
38Juan Palomo y Sierra lOMarcó, Potosí, January 27,1807, file 3; and Marcó to Palomo
y Sierra, Buenos Aires, February 26, 1807, file 4. ["quatro churlas de Cascarilla que contienen
600 libras de dicha especie"] ["los malvados Yngleses"]
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collected in Mendoza and Chile.39 Although Marcó and his commercial agents, panicularly in the
Banda Oriental, may have ttaded with the British, the cost of the military intervention to Marcó del
Pont was much higher than the benefits. No more evident was this than in the irretrievable polítical
losses that Marcó and bis fellow Spaniards ultimately suffered.
Marcó's initial political difficulties began 00 the Banda Oriental as soon as the British had
retteated from Montevideo. Apparently, he, a brother, and his agents had been ínvolved in the sale or
charter of a number of riverboats to British merchants. The boat captaíns had not received the expected
recompense and complained by the new viceroy, Santiago Líniers, the hero of the reconquest, of
Marcó's involvement in "false conttacts" with British subjects. New political forces in the Montevideo
town council and among defense authorities attempted to punish those inhabitants who had dealt with
the British. Marcó, a Spanish merchant who wanted freer ttade at Montevideo, now found himself at
odds with the Spanish naval commandant (Comandante de Marino), who supponed greater wartime
restrictions.40 Despite his financial contribution to the defense of the Río de la Plata, Marcó and his
agentsin Montevideo had been compromised by trading with the enemy.
THE BREAKDOWN OF EMPIRE
If the British invasion of the Río de la Plata had weakened the commercial and political positions
of the Spaniards, then Napoleon's invasion of Spain and his capture of the royal famíly early in 1808
provoked the final breakdown of empíreo Napoleon eventually closed Spanish ports to trade, severing
the already-damaged links to European markets on which Spanish merchants like Marcó had based
theír commercial superiority in the Americas. One of Marcó's Spanish connections in Málaga even
dírected Marcó to diven his trade to Great Britain. "Please do me the favor of remitting as soon as
possible my ponion of the cargo to Messrs. Gordon Murphy and Co. in London," the Málaga merchant
requested, "who will take care to send me the proceeds with the least charge possible; meanwhile I
flatter myself that the sales will be so advantageous that they will be able to sustain the delay in their
coming into my possession." 41 In Buenos Aíres, Marcó del Pont also was soon to experience wartime
unpleasantries.
This Spanish merchant and official of the Consolidación de Vales would'lose conttol of his royal
monies as a result of the emerging Creole conttol of politicallife in Buenos Aires. The political
struggle that followed the victory over the British invaders began to separate the Spanish-bom and the
native-bom. "Given that the durable metropolitan Spain at the same time was confronting--with little
success at first--its own war for independence," writes Halperín Donghi, "the war in the Río de la Plata
was in essence a civil war."42 Perhaps Marcó himself had brought on his own trouble, in a way, by
requesting that Viceroy Liniers return the 70,300-peso "loan" that Marcó earlier had made to the
interim govemor. Having leamed from an informant in Chile that Marcó might be holding additional
39Marcó to Sr. Regente Govemador, Buenos Aires, n.d., file 3; Maza to Marcó,
Córdoba, April16, 1807, file 6.
40zamora to Marcó, Montevideo, October 28,1807, folder 12; Juan de Dul6n to Marcó,
November 4, 1807, Zamora to Marcó, Montevideo, November 25 and 28, 1807, folder 13.
41See Sánchez de Q.S.M.R. (?) to Marcó, Málaga, January 14, 1810, folder 17;
December 7,1810 and August 19,1811, folder 18. Such contact between Spanish merchants and
Great Britain was hardly new, for it predated the Napoleonic conflicts and then was reestablished
in 1808. See John Constan se Davie, Letters from Paraguay Describing the Settlements o/
Montevideo and Buenos Aires (London, 1805), p. 87.
42Tulio Halperín Donghi, "Militarización revolucionaria en Buenos Aires, 1806-1865," in
El ocaso del orden colonial en Hispanoamérica, comp. Tulio Halperín Donghi (Buenos Aires:
Editorial Sud Americana, 1978), pp. 136-137. ["Dado que la Espafta metropolitana estable
afrontando al mismo tiempo--con poco éxito al principio--su propia guerra de independencia, la
guerra en el Río de la Plata fue en esencia una guerra civil."]
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funds belonging to the Consolidation, Viceroy Liniers instead demandOOa strict accounting. Marcó
compliOO, admitting that he stiB had 31,000 pesos in cash, whereupon, Liniers cited the "great
emergencies of the time" ("grandes urgencias de día") in ordering that Marcó deliver the remaining
money to the treasury at Buenos Aires. Marcó was unable to withstand the political pressure because
Liniers at the time was supported by rising Creole militia leaders. Yet he remindOOthe viceroy that the
money belongOO to Spain and ought to be remitted for Spain's "superior needs" whenever Marcó's
superiors demanded it.43 In fact, within two months of Marcó's losing control of the monies, he
received an order authorized by the Council of Castile (Consejo de Castilla) for the immediate
remission to Spain of all funds belonging to Real Caja de Consolidación. But the viceregal govem-
ment already had spent the money, as its outlays lO colonial militias 100by Creoles liIce Comelio de
Saavedra and Manuel Belgrano were increasing steadily. Liniers wrote to Marcó:44
When there are funds in the general Treasury of the Viceroyalty, after attending to
the emergencies of the Royal Finance, I will dispense. . . lOyou the one hundrOOand
one thousand eight hundred sixty-five pesos four and one-half reales, belonging to
the Royal House of the Consolidation, which at the command of this Superior
Authority is transferred lOthe same general Treasury, and I have pre-arrangOO it for
you according lOyour letter of the 20th of this month.
The fall of Liniers in 1809 and his replacement by the pro-Spanish Cisneros did not alleviate
Marcó's commercial tribulations. First, England's military defeat during the invasion did not prevent
the British merchants from continuing to trade in the Río de la Plata. In 1809, while Great Britain and
the Spanish independence fighters were alliOOagainst France, the British had introducOOmore than í1.2
million worth of goods into the Río de la Plata. Spanish merchants suffered fram the overseas
competition and demanded the expulsion of the British. However, Viceroy Cisneros sorely needed
new revenues: because he was unable to restrict British trade without reducing customs revenues that
financOO his govemment. A subsequent Cisneros order to expel the fifty British merchants still
resident in Buenos Aires and Montevideo was never carried out, because political events tooIc prece-
dence.45 The continuing political crisis prevented the viceroy from repaying Marcó's "emergency"
loans.
Final Creole political victory, marked by the the takeover of porteño govemment in the cabildo
abierto on May 10, 1810 by militia officer Comelio de Saavedra further eroded Marcó's claim for
repayment of his "loan" to the govemment. Within two weeIcs of the establishment of thecabildo
abierto, Saavedra himself rebuffed a final effort by Marcó to regain the monies of the Consolidación.46
Clearly, the Creole political forces were no longer willing to allow colonial taxes lObe sent lO Spain.
An additional element entered into the junta's decision to penalize the wealthier Spanish-bom
merchants liIce Marcó del PonL Creole politicians were appealing lOmembers of the clases plebeyas,
some eight thousand of whom were under arms in the city of Buenos Aires alone. They rOOistributed
wealth fram the most elevatOOsocial groups lOthe lowest. In gaining greater control over finances and
43See the correspondence between Marcó and Liniers of October 1808, folder 16.
44Marcó to Liniers, Buenos Aires, December 20,1808, and Liniers lOMarcó, Buenos
Aires, December 24, 1808, folder 16.
45Dorothy Bume Goebel, "British Trade to the Spanish Colonies, 1796-1823," American
Historical Review 43, no. 2 (January 1938): 309-310; Cuccorese and Panettieri, Argentina.
manual de historia económica, pp. 154, 169; John Lynch, The Spanish American Revolutions.
1808-1826 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1973), p. 47; Germán O. E. TjarIcsand Alicia
Vidaurreta, El comercio inglés y el contrabando: Nuevos aspectos en el estudio de la política
económica en el Río de la Plata. 1807-18lO (Buenos Aires: Published by Author, 1962), p. 21.
46Comelio de Saavedra to Marcó, June 8,1810, and Marcó lOSaavedra, Buenos Aires,
June 14, 1810, folder 16.
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taxation, the new creole politicians were engaging in a process of state recentralization within the city
of Buenos Aires. Part of that process involved removing the control of public monies from Spanish
merchants and from semiofficial tax farmers.47 And Marcó had served in both capacities.
Simultaneously, the rebellion of the Creo les and their plebeian followers began to destroy Marcó's
commercial network within the hinterland of South America. Military uprisings interrupted trade
through the interior to Potosí, and Marcó's Spanish kin fled from Córdoba and Mendoza and later from
Santiago, Lima, Alto Perú, and ultimately Montevideo. Commenting on the social chaos that resulted
from the political breakdown, one British resident contrasted the once prosperous estancias of the
Banda Oriental 10 the "distress and wretchedness" and the scattering of the great herds effected by the
"banditti" of guerrilla leader José Gervasio Artigas.48 The wars of independence were reducing the
mighty colonial economy to ruin.
Like many other Spaniards, Marcó soon fled Buenos Aires, abandoning his Creole family. After
all, although her father was a Spaniard, Marcó's wife had been born in Buenos Aires, as Marcó's
children had been.49 A son, Agustín, followed a porteño arrny into Alto Perú and eventually settled
down in Salta as a patriot military officer--not as a merchant. It is important to note that Agustín, as a
Creole, did not inherit the international social contacts that his merchant father had hado In an irony of
empire, the Spanish family of Marcó del Pont yet was to playa role in imperial affairs in the Americas.
Ferdinand VII appointed a younger brother, General Francisco Casimiro Marcó del Pont, as capitán
general of the Reino de Chile, where in 1917 he was defeated at the Battle of Chacabuco by General
José de San Martín.
The Spanish loss of control over colonial finances in the Río de la Plata-as Marcó had lost 101,000
pesos of the Consolidation funds-signaled the end of two and one-half centuries of Spanish political
hegemony. The European wars had destroyed the commercial and political connections of Spaniards.
Marcó del Pont had maintained connections based on kinship and Spanish birth among merchants,
bonding various parts of empire into a whole, and other Spanish officials for generations had multiplied
these same kinds of colonial tieso Destruction of these Spanish social bonds ended the colonial era.
Even those Spanish-born merchants like the Anchorenas and Alzagas, the last of whom, like Marcó,
fled into exile, were able to bequeath to their sons only a much-restricted local commercial network.50
Although the British, Germans, Americans, and French after 1810 had the necessary command of
markets and capital to reconnect Buenos Aires to Europe, they were unable to reconstruct the social
connections to Peru, Chile, Bolivia, and Paraguay that the Spaniards had maintained during the
colonial periodo Even Creo les were unable to reestablish those continental networks. They simply
lacked the ties of kinship and regional origin of the fleeing Spaniards-a fact that undoubtedly
contributed to the political decentralization and economic decay of the post-independence era in Latin
America. In the Río de la Plata, the Creole progeny of the viceregal commercial elite therefore moved
into cattle raising.51 Buenos Aires and South America had entered a new age.
47Halperín Donghi, "Militarización revolucionaria en Buenos Aires," pp. 157-158; and
Tulio Halperín Donghi, Guerra y finanzas en los orígenes del estado argentino (1791-1850)
(Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano, 1982), pp. 15,88.
48Mawe, Travels in the Interior of Brazil, pp. 17-18.
491n 1822, Marcó's wife once again petitioned the government of Buenos Aires for
repayment of Marcó's 101,OOO-peso"loan," which the government declined to do. See García to
Francisca Vivar de Marcó, November 28 and 30, 1822, folder 21. On the family of Marcó del
Pont, see Vicente OsvaldoCutolo,Nuevo diccionario biográfico argentino (1750-1930)(Buenos
Aires: Editorial Elches, 1968), pp. 391-393.
50Robinson, "The Merchants ofPost-Independence Buenos Aires," pp. 124, 127.
51Luis Alberto Romero, "Buenos Aires: la sociedad criolla, 1810-1850," Revista de
Indias, 41, nos. 163-164(1981): 146;Vera BlinnReber,British MercantileHouses in Buenos
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APPENDIX
Siendo ya muy repetidas las instancias que se promueven sobre el modo de recaudar las
anualidades que deben satisfacerse por los Provistos en Dignidades, Canongias, y Prevendas de las
y glesias del Reyno, se hace sumamente preciso establecer un método que sirva de regla general en la
materia y evite al mismo tiempo la reiteración de iguales controversias, con que después de ser
perjudicado el Ramo de la pronta percepción de sus legítimos ingresos, se embarazan también con
freguencia las atenciones de esta Superioridad y las de los demás Jefes de las Provincias del Vir-
reynato, he declarado contar justo objeto que todo Individuo que por razón de haber sido presentado
para alguna Dignidad, Canongia, o Prevenda deba satisfacer la anualidad correspondiente o por quartas
partes or por octabas, según las resoluciones que se han recivido de la Comisión guvematiba de
Consolidación, no podrá ni percivir integramente su renta para verificar por si mismo el pago de la
anualidad, sino que en el acto de los repartos que en cada Tercio del año se practicasen, se deberá hacer
descuento de lo que por aquel derecho le toque contribuir, para lo qual el Contador de Diezmos ya
deberá llevar formadas las Planillas respectibas del haber de cada participe en el mismo reparto, y de la
cantidad a que es responsable para la expuesta anualidad, y reunidas todas las que se descuente se
pasarán tambien en el mismo acto a los' Reales Cajas, de donde con intervención de dicho Contador de
Diezmos y Quedando en ellas la devida constancia o las recibirá el Individuo que para el efecto haya
nombrado el Receptor Gral de los Caudales de Consolidación Don Ventura Miguel Marcó o las dirigirá
a poder de este el mismo Contador de Diezmos según se hubieren puesto de acuerdo, dando siempre
noticia al respectibo Govemador Intendente o Jefe que ejerciese sus funciones, para que por suparte la
comunique también a esta Superioridad.
El Marqués de Sobremonte to Ventura Miguel Marcó del Pont, Buenos Aires, November 15,1806, file
2, Papeles, Ventura Miguel Marc6 del Pont, Benson Latin American Collection, University of Texas at
Austin.
....................
Luego que haya fondos en la Tesorería gral. de Virreinato, después de atender a las urgencias de la
Rl. Hacienda, dispondré, que como se ofreció a Vd., se le reintegren los cientos y un mil ochocientos
sesenta y cinco pesos quatro y medio reales, pertenecientes a la Rl. Casa de Consolidación, que por
disposición de esta Superioridad tiene entregados en la misma Tesorería general, y lo prevengo a Vd.
en contextación a su oficio de 20 del corriente.
Santiago de Liniers to Marcó, Buenos Aires, December 24, 1808, folder 16.
....................
Aires. 1810-1880 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 143; José M. Mariluz
Urquijo, Estado e industria (1810-1862) (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Macchi, 1969), p. 11; H. S.
Fems, Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), pp. 64-
65.
